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Don’t Spiders Have Intentions?

Sam’s Objection to Frankfurt’s Argument from Spiders

‘... concepts which are inapplicable to spiders and their ilk.’

Frankfurt 1978, p. 162

‘Many animals that do not have conceptual intentions flexibly exercise agential control. [...] Spiders very likely do not have them’

\citep{buehler:2019_flexible}

Buehler, 2019

Jackson & Cross, 2011 figure 3

caption: ‘Portia labiata (left) from the Philippines stalking a spitting spider, Scytodes pallida (right). Approaching head on would bring Portia into Scytodes’ line of fire. Instead, Portia executes a planned detour by which it approaches this dangerous prey from the rear.’
‘Distances between Portia and the surrounding array are too far for Portia to cross simply by leaping. The only way Portia can reach its prey is to walk down to the floor and over to one of the two poles, climb it and then follow the path to the prey. However, once on the floor, Portia can no longer see the prey.’
‘P. labiata foregoes the detour and instead takes the shorter, faster head-on approach when the spider it sees in a web is a Scytodes female that is carrying eggs (Li and Jackson, 2003). This makes sense because Scytodes females carry their eggs around in their mouths. Egg-carrying females can still spit, but only by first releasing their eggs (Li et al., 1999). Being reluctant to release their eggs, egg-carrying females are, for P. labiata, less dangerous as prey.’
But is this prey-specific activity really evidence of planning? No!

Jackson & Cross, 2011 figure 2

caption: ‘Apparatus used for testing Portia fimbriata’s detour-planning ability. Portia was on top of the central pole before each test began. The prey item (lure made by mounting a dead spider in life-like posture on a cork disc) (not shown) was on one of the two ramps (whether on the left or the right ramp decided at random). Portia viewed the prey while on top of the central pole but could not see the prey when it went down the pole. By consistently taking the route that leads to the prey, Portia demonstrates ability to plan ahead.’
‘P. labiata foregoes the detour and instead takes the shorter, faster head-on approach when the spider it sees in a web is a Scytodes female that is carrying eggs (Li and Jackson, 2003). This makes sense because Scytodes females carry their eggs around in their mouths. Egg-carrying females can still spit, but only by first releasing their eggs (Li et al., 1999). Being reluctant to release their eggs, egg-carrying females are, for P. labiata, less dangerous as prey.’
‘Portia’s task always came down to choosing which one of two paths would lead to the prey. Sometimes Portia had to walk past the wrong pole before reaching the correct pole, and sometimes Portia had to head directly away from the prey before accessing the correct pole. Yet, regardless of the details and despite having no prior experi- ence of taking or even seeing the paths available in the experiments, Portia chose the correct pole significantly more often than the wrong pole.’

‘... concepts which are inapplicable to spiders and their ilk.’

Frankfurt 1978, p. 162

‘Many animals that do not have conceptual intentions flexibly exercise agential control. [...] Spiders very likely do not have them’

\citep{buehler:2019_flexible}

Buehler, 2019

never trust a philosopher

opinions

There is the internet for that.

It’s not about you.

1. There is a contrast between actions and mere happenings in the lives of spiders.

2. The contrast in the lives of humans is the same.

3. Spiders do not have intentions, nor do they deliberate about what to do.

Therefore (from 1 & 3):

4. The contrast in the case of spiders cannot be explicated by appeal to intention.

Therefore (from 2 & 4):

5. The contrast in the case of humans cannot be explicated by appeal to intention.

Options:

try a different line

switch animals

further explicate the notion of intention

intentions as elements in plans

vs

representations which somehow guide actions

Which would you choose at this point?

‘... concepts which are inapplicable to spiders and their ilk.’

Frankfurt 1978, p. 162

‘Many animals that do not have conceptual intentions flexibly exercise agential control. [...] Spiders very likely do not have them’

\citep{buehler:2019_flexible}

Buehler, 2019

Difficulty is going to be to able to combine the view that spiders exercise agential control while holding that they lack intentions.
Later we might see that Bach’s notion of ‘executive representation’ allows us to do this.
For what it’s worth (nothing), I have argued that just this combination is possible. But doing that would take us too far away from the more basic issues. (Generality vs depth.)

Options:

try a different line

switch animals

further explicate the notion of intention

intentions as elements in plans

vs

representations which somehow guide actions

What is the mark that distinguishes actions?

Davidson’s View

It is intention (or justifying reasons).

Objection:

Frankfurt’s Argument from Spiders