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Simple Seeing

‘If psychologists can really identify something that deserves to be called perception without awareness, they must have an operational grasp on not only what it takes to perceive something, but on what it takes to be conscious of it.

\citep[p.~148]{Dretske:2006fv}

Dretske, 2006 p. 148

We need to start by clarifying what we mean by perceiving. To this end I want to introduce an old story that we will also use later (for Sense & Reference).

Siegel & Shuster, 1939 (Issue 1)

Siegel & Shuster, 1939 (Issue 1)

Siegel & Shuster, 1939 (Issue 1)

Does Lois see the unbearable coward?

Does Lois see the unbearable coward?

1. Lois sees Superman.

2. Superman is Clark.

3. Clark is the unbearable coward.

Therefore:

4. Superman is the unbearable coward.

How did I get here?

Therefore:

5. Lois sees the unbearable coward.

1. If Lois could see the unbearable coward, she’d know where he is.

2. Lois does not know where the unbearable coward is.

Therefore:

3. Lois cannot see the unbearable coward.

Simple Seeing (aka Nonepistemic Seeing)

Dretske introduces the notion of \emph{simple seeing} (see \citealp[chapter 6]{Dretske:2000ky}; the same thing is called as ‘nonepistemic seeing’ in \citep{Dretske:1969td}). The key characteristic of simple seeing: if X is the F, then \emph{S sees X} is equivalent to \emph{S sees the F}.

Key characteristic of simple seeing: if X is the F, then S sees X is equivalent to S sees the F.

\citep[p.~54]{Dretske:1969td}.

Dretske, 1969 chapter II; Dretske 2000 chapter 6

‘Seeing objects is a way of getting information about them. What makes it seeing (rather than, say, hearing) is the intrinsic character of those events occurring in us that carry the information. What makes it X (rather than Y) that we see is that the information these internal events carry is information about X (rather than Y). Everything else [...] is [...] something the scientist, not the philosopher, should provide’ \citep[p.~112]{Dretske:2000ky}.

‘If psychologists can really identify something that deserves to be called perception without awareness, they must have an operational grasp on not only what it takes to perceive something, but on what it takes to be conscious of it.

\citep[p.~148]{Dretske:2006fv}

Dretske, 2006 p. 148

We have been clarifying what we mean by perceiving.

Siegel & Shuster, 1939 (Issue 1)

Can you perceive something without being perceptually aware of it?

The question is trivial if we interpret ‘perceive’ so that this (Lois’ seeing superman but not being aware of the unbearable coward) counts as a case of perceiving without awareness.
To make this question hard, and therefore interesting, we need to understand ‘perceive’ in the sense of simple seeing.

‘Perception without awareness [...] is therefore to be understood as perception of some object without awareness [...] of that object’

Dretske, 2006

\citep{Dretske:2006fv}.
Note that we have not attempted to discover the design of the mind, merely made a distinction.

‘Here lies the fatal flaw in [...] the philosophy of mind,

for, in using as evidence what seems reasonable or persuasive, philosophers ultimately rely on their own introspections.

They look inside themselves
in an attempt
to discover the design of the mind’

\citep[p.~380]{bridgeman2004philosophy}

Bridgeman, 2004 p. 380