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Bok and Sen on Sidgwick’s Dilemma

Old Question (Bad)

Is nationality a ‘morally irrelevant characteristic’?

New Question (Better)

Is nationality morally irrelevant to how people of different nationalities should be treated or valued?

‘Henry Sidgwick took the contrast between [...] two perspectives to be so serious as to threaten any coherent view of ethics.

On one hand, he held as the fundamental principle of ethics “that another’s greater good is to be preferred to one’s own lesser good.” According to this principle, any sacrifice on one’s own part would be called for, so long as it could achieve a greater good for others, no matter where they lived.

On the other hand, Sidgwick also accepted what he called the common-sense view that our obligations to help others differ depending on the relationships in which we stand to them---relationships of family member, friend, neighbor, and fellow citizen.’

\citep[p.~40]{bok:1996_love}

Bok 1996, p. 40

Should we therefore reject the claim that nationality is ethically irrelevant after all?
For our purposes it doesn’t matter very much thanks to Sen.
The primary thing is to ‘bring everyone into the domain of concern, without eliminating anyone’. After doing that, we may find reason to give ‘additional weight to the interests of those who are linked to us in some significant way’ \citep[p.~114]{sen:1996_love}.

‘our common humanity has perspicuous moral relevance’

‘one’s fundamental allegiance is to humanity at large’

The primary thing is to ‘bring everyone into the domain of concern, without eliminating anyone’

After that, we may find reason to give ‘additional weight to the interests of those who are linked to us in some significant way’

Sen, 1996 p. 114

I’m not sure Sen’s reasoning for this
But the reasoning is less important than the conclusion.
recall the dilemma from Bok-Sidgwick ...
Can you see how Sen helps with the dilemma?
I think: there’s no real tension here at all. Obligations to help others do differ depending on citizenship; but the primary thing is obligations to people as people.
So the key here is that there is a ranking of things.

‘Henry Sidgwick took the contrast between [...] two perspectives to be so serious as to threaten any coherent view of ethics.

On one hand, he held as the fundamental principle of ethics “that another’s greater good is to be preferred to one’s own lesser good.” According to this principle, any sacrifice on one’s own part would be called for, so long as it could achieve a greater good for others, no matter where they lived.

On the other hand, Sidgwick also accepted what he called the common-sense view that our obligations to help others differ depending on the relationships in which we stand to them---relationships of family member, friend, neighbor, and fellow citizen.’

Bok 1996, p. 40