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Frankfurt’s Further Objections to Causal Theories of Action
Frankfurt’s Objection from Knowledge
‘Causal theories imply that actions and mere happenings do not differ essentially in themselves at all.’
‘They are therefore committed to supposing that a person who knows he is in the midst of performing an action cannot have derived this knowledge from any awareness of what is currently happening, but that he must have derived it instead from his understanding of how what is happening was caused to happen by’
Frankfurt, 1978 p. 157
How can we individuate events? By their causes and effects.
Objection: Couldn’t an event have had effects other than those it actually had?
I was unlucky. That shot might not have killed him.
Reply: no.
Frankfurt’s Objection from Knowledge
‘Causal theories imply that actions and mere happenings do not differ essentially in themselves at all.’
‘They are therefore committed to supposing that a person who knows he is in the midst of performing an action cannot have derived this knowledge from any awareness of what is currently happening, but that he must have derived it instead from his understanding of how what is happening was caused to happen by’
Frankfurt, 1978 p. 157
Frankfurt’s Objection from Deviant Causal Chains
‘No matter what kinds of causal antecedents are designated as necessary and sufficient for the occurrence of an action, it is easy to show that causal antecedents of that kind may have as their effect an event that is manifestly not an action but a mere bodily movement’
Frankfurt, 1978 p. 157
What is the mark that distinguishes actions?
Davidson’s View
It is intention (or justifying reasons).
Objection:
Frankfurt’s Argument from Spiders
Bach’s objections from absent-minded, instinctive and impulive actions.
Frankfurt’s View
Action is ‘behaviour whose course is under the guidance of an agent’.
Two Problems:
What is guidance?
When is guidance ‘attributable to an agent’?
Strong claim: To be an action is to be caused by an intention.
Weak claim: To be an action is to stand in some specific, but here unspecified, relation to an intention.
Frankfurt’s Objection from Deviant Causal Chains
‘No matter what kinds of causal antecedents are designated as necessary and sufficient for the occurrence of an action, it is easy to show that causal antecedents of that kind may have as their effect an event that is manifestly not an action but a mere bodily movement’
Frankfurt, 1978 p. 157
Frankfurt’s Objection from Being in Touch
‘... the most salient differentiating characteristic of action: during the time a person is performing an action he is necessarily in touch with the movements of his body in a certain way, whereas he is necessarily not in touch with them in that way when movements of his body are occurring without his making them.
‘A theory that is limited to describing causes prior to the occurrences of actions and of mere bodily movements cannot possibly include an analysis of these two ways in which a person may be related to the may occur when an action is being performed or movements of his body. It must inevitably open the possibility that a person, whatever his involvement in the events from which his action arises, loses all connection with the movements of his body at the moment when his action begins.’
Frankfurt, 1978 p. 158
What is the mark that distinguishes actions?
It is intention (or justifying reasons).
Objection:
Frankfurt’s Argument from Spiders
Bach’s objections from absent-minded, instinctive and impulive actions.
Frankfurt’s View
Action is ‘behaviour whose course is under the guidance of an agent’.
Two Problems:
What is guidance?
When is guidance ‘attributable to an agent’?
‘A theory that is limited to describing causes prior to the occurrences of actions and of mere bodily movements cannot possibly include an analysis of these two ways in which a person may be related to the may occur when an action is being performed or movements of his body. It must inevitably open the possibility that a person, whatever his involvement in the events from which his action arises, loses all connection with the movements of his body at the moment when his action begins.’
Frankfurt, 1978 p. 158
‘... the most salient differentiating characteristic of action: during the time a person is performing an action he is necessarily in touch with the movements of his body in a certain way, whereas he is necessarily not in touch with them in that way when movements of his body are occurring without his making them.
Frankfurt’s mistake?
‘According to causal theories [...] the essential difference between events of the two types [actions vs things that merely happen to an agent] is to be found in their prior causal histories: a [pattern of joint displacements and bodily configurations] is an action if and only if it results from antecedents of a certain kind.’
Frankfurt, 1978 p. 157