‘If psychologists can really identify something that deserves to be called perception without awareness, they must have an operational grasp on not only what it takes to perceive something, but on what it takes to be conscious of it.
\citep[p.~148]{Dretske:2006fv}
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This was the point of talking about simple seeing.
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‘If psychologists can really identify something that deserves to be called perception without awareness, they must have an operational grasp on not only what it takes to perceive something, but on what it takes to be conscious of it.
\citep[p.~148]{Dretske:2006fv}
--------
considerations just raised imply we should not consider Sidis as
entirely compelling evidence.
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What about blindsight? Should we consider this in the same way?
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This conclusion is not entirely safe because we are relying on the subject’s reports.
--------
But wait ...
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‘the claim that blindsight involves unconscious perception is largely based
on a dissociation between responding in a biased task and performance
in an unbiased forced-choice task’
\citep[p.~435]{phillips:2016_consciousness}
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Looks like Philips is right ...
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‘the claim that blindsight involves unconscious perception is largely based
on a dissociation between responding in a biased task and performance
in an unbiased forced-choice task’
\citep[p.~435]{phillips:2016_consciousness}
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‘He was insistently instructed, and frequently reminded, that he was to signal unaware only when he had absolutely no sensation or feeling or experience of the visual event, and he repeatedly confirmed his conformance with this instruction’
\citep[p.~6122]{weiskrantz:1995_parameters}
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Status : unresolved whether blindsight is evidence for perception without awareness at this point.
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‘If psychologists can really identify something that deserves to be called perception without awareness, they must have an operational grasp on not only what it takes to perceive something, but on what it takes to be conscious of it.
\citep[p.~148]{Dretske:2006fv}
But our current concern is to find a test for perceptual awareness.
Can we make progress here?
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‘According to ‘objective’ criteria, unaware perception
occurs when a subject’s performance in a forced-choice task is at chance’
\citep[p.~190]{pessoa:2005_what}
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Is this a good criterion?
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Criticism of objective criterion
The objective criterion isn't s criterion for awareness, it is a criterion
for discrimination. We should only accept it if we this there's no
discrimination without awareness.
More on the objective criterion: if there is perception it may trigger
action or shift. In attention or some further processing, and awareness of
this could be used to discriminate. So intentional, explicit discrimination
tasks are of course tests of awareness of some.kind : but they are not
tests of *perceptual* awareness.
Support for this criticism of objective measures: 'they presuppose, unlike
subjective methods, that awareness of some information and (behavioral)
sensitivity to that same information involve the very same processes'
\citep[p.~22]{timmermans:2015_how}
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'Above-chance performance on a forced-choice task involving the masked
stimulus need not necessarily be due to conscious knowledge'
\citep[p.~27]{timmermans:2015_how}
--------
'The challenge of measuring awareness based on behavioral measures, despite
the substantial progress achieved over the years, remains essentially
intact'
\citep[p.~40]{timmermans:2015_how}
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‘rTa: S is aware of X = S perceives X, and information about X is available
to S as a reason (justification) for doing what she wants (chooses,
decides) to do’
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‘If psychologists can really identify something that deserves to be called perception without awareness, they must have an operational grasp on not only what it takes to perceive something, but on what it takes to be conscious of it.
\citep[p.~148]{Dretske:2006fv}