Keyboard Shortcuts?

×
  • Next step
  • Previous step
  • Skip this slide
  • Previous slide
  • mShow slide thumbnails
  • nShow notes
  • hShow handout latex source
  • NShow talk notes latex source

Click here and press the right key for the next slide (or swipe left)

also ...

Press the left key to go backwards (or swipe right)

Press n to toggle whether notes are shown (or add '?notes' to the url before the #)

Press m or double tap to slide thumbnails (menu)

Press ? at any time to show the keyboard shortcuts

\title {Central Themes in Philosophy \\ Lecture 15}
 
\maketitle
 

Lecture 15:

Central Themes

\def \ititle {Lecture 15}
\def \isubtitle {Central Themes}
\begin{center}
{\Large
\textbf{\ititle}: \isubtitle
}
 
\iemail %
\end{center}

Q

What is the mark that distinguishes actions?

\citep{Davidson:1971fz}.

‘The problem of action is to explicate the contrast between
what an agent does
and
what merely happens to him‘

\citep[p.~157]{frankfurt1978problem}.

Frankfurt, 1978 p. 157

‘we have to carefully distinguish explanatory reasons, the reasons why S does A or believes P, from justifying reasons, S’s reasons for doing A or believing P, the reasons S (if able) might give to justify doing A or believing P.’ \citep[p.~168]{Dretske:2006fv}. (You may remember this distinction from Theme 1, Perception without Awareness.)
Explanatory reason example: Steve arrived looking like that for the reason that the path was so muddy.
Justifying reason example: Steve walked to the party because he believed it would be more romantic.

Explanatory vs Justifying Reasons (Dretske again)

Explanatory Reasons

Mark: factive (must be true); no point of view.

Why did Steve arrive looking like that?

- Because the path was so muddy.

Why did the sign fall over?

- Because the path was so muddy.

Justifying Reasons

Mark: nonfactive (can be false); agent’s point of view.

Why did Steve walk to the party?

- Because he believed it would be more romantic.

It wasn’t; it was too muddy.
How is this relevant to our question?

Q

What is the mark that distinguishes actions?

A.1

It is intention.

A.2

Actions are events for which there are justifying reasons.

Do you understand the answers? Are they one answer or two?

Among all the considerations which are, or might be, explanatory reasons for an action, what determines which are (the agent’s) justifying reasons?

Why did you run?

Ayesha

Desire: I catch the bus.

Belief: Running is a way of arriving at the stop before the bus leaves.

Intention: I run to the bus stop.

Beatrice

Desire: I catch the bus.

Belief: Running is a way of geting the driver to wait by signalling my desire.

Intention: I run to the bus stop.

They have different justifying reasons. In virtue of what is this true?
In part it’s a matter of what they believe. But not just this. After all, they might have the same beliefs and yet not count the same things as reasons which justify their running. (Ask each, Why did you run?)

Among all the considerations which are, or might be, explanatory reasons for an action, what determines which are (the agent’s) justifying reasons?

It’s those of her beliefs which lead to her forming the intention which guides her action.

What is the mark that distinguishes actions?

Davidson’s View

It is intention (or justifying reasons).

Objection:

Frankfurt’s Argument from Spiders

remind yourselves of the Argument from Spiders
 

Don’t Spiders Have Intentions?

 
\section{Don’t Spiders Have Intentions?}
 
\section{Don’t Spiders Have Intentions?}

Sam’s Objection to Frankfurt’s Argument from Spiders

‘... concepts which are inapplicable to spiders and their ilk.’

Frankfurt 1978, p. 162

‘Many animals that do not have conceptual intentions flexibly exercise agential control. [...] Spiders very likely do not have them’

\citep{buehler:2019_flexible}

Buehler, 2019

Jackson & Cross, 2011 figure 3

caption: ‘Portia labiata (left) from the Philippines stalking a spitting spider, Scytodes pallida (right). Approaching head on would bring Portia into Scytodes’ line of fire. Instead, Portia executes a planned detour by which it approaches this dangerous prey from the rear.’
‘Distances between Portia and the surrounding array are too far for Portia to cross simply by leaping. The only way Portia can reach its prey is to walk down to the floor and over to one of the two poles, climb it and then follow the path to the prey. However, once on the floor, Portia can no longer see the prey.’
‘P. labiata foregoes the detour and instead takes the shorter, faster head-on approach when the spider it sees in a web is a Scytodes female that is carrying eggs (Li and Jackson, 2003). This makes sense because Scytodes females carry their eggs around in their mouths. Egg-carrying females can still spit, but only by first releasing their eggs (Li et al., 1999). Being reluctant to release their eggs, egg-carrying females are, for P. labiata, less dangerous as prey.’
But is this prey-specific activity really evidence of planning? No!

Jackson & Cross, 2011 figure 2

caption: ‘Apparatus used for testing Portia fimbriata’s detour-planning ability. Portia was on top of the central pole before each test began. The prey item (lure made by mounting a dead spider in life-like posture on a cork disc) (not shown) was on one of the two ramps (whether on the left or the right ramp decided at random). Portia viewed the prey while on top of the central pole but could not see the prey when it went down the pole. By consistently taking the route that leads to the prey, Portia demonstrates ability to plan ahead.’
‘P. labiata foregoes the detour and instead takes the shorter, faster head-on approach when the spider it sees in a web is a Scytodes female that is carrying eggs (Li and Jackson, 2003). This makes sense because Scytodes females carry their eggs around in their mouths. Egg-carrying females can still spit, but only by first releasing their eggs (Li et al., 1999). Being reluctant to release their eggs, egg-carrying females are, for P. labiata, less dangerous as prey.’
‘Portia’s task always came down to choosing which one of two paths would lead to the prey. Sometimes Portia had to walk past the wrong pole before reaching the correct pole, and sometimes Portia had to head directly away from the prey before accessing the correct pole. Yet, regardless of the details and despite having no prior experi- ence of taking or even seeing the paths available in the experiments, Portia chose the correct pole significantly more often than the wrong pole.’

‘... concepts which are inapplicable to spiders and their ilk.’

Frankfurt 1978, p. 162

‘Many animals that do not have conceptual intentions flexibly exercise agential control. [...] Spiders very likely do not have them’

\citep{buehler:2019_flexible}

Buehler, 2019

never trust a philosopher

opinions

There is the internet for that.

It’s not about you.

1. There is a contrast between actions and mere happenings in the lives of spiders.

2. The contrast in the lives of humans is the same.

3. Spiders do not have intentions, nor do they deliberate about what to do.

Therefore (from 1 & 3):

4. The contrast in the case of spiders cannot be explicated by appeal to intention.

Therefore (from 2 & 4):

5. The contrast in the case of humans cannot be explicated by appeal to intention.

Options:

try a different line

switch animals

further explicate the notion of intention

intentions as elements in plans

vs

representations which somehow guide actions

Which would you choose at this point?

‘... concepts which are inapplicable to spiders and their ilk.’

Frankfurt 1978, p. 162

‘Many animals that do not have conceptual intentions flexibly exercise agential control. [...] Spiders very likely do not have them’

\citep{buehler:2019_flexible}

Buehler, 2019

Difficulty is going to be to able to combine the view that spiders exercise agential control while holding that they lack intentions.
Later we might see that Bach’s notion of ‘executive representation’ allows us to do this.
For what it’s worth (nothing), I have argued that just this combination is possible. But doing that would take us too far away from the more basic issues. (Generality vs depth.)

Options:

try a different line

switch animals

further explicate the notion of intention

intentions as elements in plans

vs

representations which somehow guide actions

What is the mark that distinguishes actions?

Davidson’s View

It is intention (or justifying reasons).

Objection:

Frankfurt’s Argument from Spiders

Options:

try a different line

switch animals

further explicate the notion of intention

intentions as elements in plans

vs

representations which somehow guide actions

Bach offers a further argument

‘some actions are performed too automatically, routinely, and/or unthinkingly to be in any way intentional.

There need be nothing intentional about scratching an itch [...]

There need be nothing intentional about [...] ducking under a flying object.

Impulsive actions are not intentional’

\citep[p.~363]{bach:1978_representational}.

Bach, 1978 p. 363

Use this to construct an objection to Davidson’s View (along the lines of Frankfurt’s Argument from Spiders).
But is the objection any good?

1. Ducking under a flying object is an action.

2. When you duck under a flying object, there is no intention you are acting on.

Therefore:

3. Intention is not the mark that distinguishes actions.

Why accept this premise? Is there any coherent view on which it’s not an action?
After being bitten by spiders, we should be more cautious here.
‘it is unclear whether we can appeal to a general intention to protect myself from flying objects to explain [...] why my catching the ball [or ducking Bach’s flying object] is intentional’ \citep[p.~395 footnote 26]{Bratman:1984jr}.

conclusion

In conclusion, ...

What is the mark that distinguishes actions?

Davidson’s View

It is intention (or justifying reasons).

Objection:

Frankfurt’s Argument from Spiders

Bach’s objections from absent-minded, instinctive and impulive actions [??]

Frankfurt’s View

Action is ‘behaviour whose course is under the guidance of an agent’.

Two Problems:

What is guidance?

When is guidance ‘attributable to an agent’?

Consider that the spider’s movements walking on the web are guided by the web’s structure. And similarly for your actions when driving on the roads. (Guiding is not only something you do, but something that is done to you.)

next theme: suicide

 

Frankfurt’s Further Objections to Causal Theories of Action

 
\section{Frankfurt’s Further Objections to Causal Theories of Action}
 
\section{Frankfurt’s Further Objections to Causal Theories of Action}

Frankfurt’s Objection from Knowledge

‘Causal theories imply that actions and mere happenings do not differ essentially in themselves at all.’

‘They are therefore committed to supposing that a person who knows he is in the midst of performing an action cannot have derived this knowledge from any awareness of what is currently happening, but that he must have derived it instead from his understanding of how what is happening was caused to happen by’

\citep[p.~157]{frankfurt1978problem}.

Frankfurt, 1978 p. 157

Why not? Claim is that actions are events appropriately related to intentions. This may involve the intention having an ongoing role. For example (not mine), consider how an intention to swim the channel will sustain swimming (drop the intention and climb aboard the boat).

How can we individuate events? By their causes and effects.

Objection: Couldn’t an event have had effects other than those it actually had?

I was unlucky. That shot might not have killed him.

Reply: no.

Frankfurt’s Objection from Knowledge

‘Causal theories imply that actions and mere happenings do not differ essentially in themselves at all.’

‘They are therefore committed to supposing that a person who knows he is in the midst of performing an action cannot have derived this knowledge from any awareness of what is currently happening, but that he must have derived it instead from his understanding of how what is happening was caused to happen by’

\citep[p.~157]{frankfurt1978problem}.

Frankfurt, 1978 p. 157

Frankfurt’s Objection from Deviant Causal Chains

‘No matter what kinds of causal antecedents are designated as necessary and sufficient for the occurrence of an action, it is easy to show that causal antecedents of that kind may have as their effect an event that is manifestly not an action but a mere bodily movement’

\citep[p.~157]{frankfurt1978problem}.

Frankfurt, 1978 p. 157

What is the mark that distinguishes actions?

Davidson’s View

It is intention (or justifying reasons).

Objection:

Frankfurt’s Argument from Spiders

Bach’s objections from absent-minded, instinctive and impulive actions.

Frankfurt’s View

Action is ‘behaviour whose course is under the guidance of an agent’.

Two Problems:

What is guidance?

When is guidance ‘attributable to an agent’?

Strong claim: To be an action is to be caused by an intention.

Weak claim: To be an action is to stand in some specific, but here unspecified, relation to an intention.

Frankfurt’s Objection from Deviant Causal Chains

‘No matter what kinds of causal antecedents are designated as necessary and sufficient for the occurrence of an action, it is easy to show that causal antecedents of that kind may have as their effect an event that is manifestly not an action but a mere bodily movement’

\citep[p.~157]{frankfurt1978problem}.

Frankfurt, 1978 p. 157

Frankfurt’s Objection from Being in Touch

‘... the most salient differentiating characteristic of action: during the time a person is performing an action he is necessarily in touch with the movements of his body in a certain way, whereas he is necessarily not in touch with them in that way when movements of his body are occurring without his making them.

‘A theory that is limited to describing causes prior to the occurrences of actions and of mere bodily movements cannot possibly include an analysis of these two ways in which a person may be related to the may occur when an action is being performed or movements of his body. It must inevitably open the possibility that a person, whatever his involvement in the events from which his action arises, loses all connection with the movements of his body at the moment when his action begins.’

\citep[p.~158]{frankfurt1978problem}.

Frankfurt, 1978 p. 158

What is the mark that distinguishes actions?

It is intention (or justifying reasons).

Objection:

Frankfurt’s Argument from Spiders

Bach’s objections from absent-minded, instinctive and impulive actions.

Frankfurt’s View

Action is ‘behaviour whose course is under the guidance of an agent’.

Two Problems:

What is guidance?

When is guidance ‘attributable to an agent’?

‘A theory that is limited to describing causes prior to the occurrences of actions and of mere bodily movements cannot possibly include an analysis of these two ways in which a person may be related to the may occur when an action is being performed or movements of his body. It must inevitably open the possibility that a person, whatever his involvement in the events from which his action arises, loses all connection with the movements of his body at the moment when his action begins.’

\citep[p.~158]{frankfurt1978problem}.

Frankfurt, 1978 p. 158

‘... the most salient differentiating characteristic of action: during the time a person is performing an action he is necessarily in touch with the movements of his body in a certain way, whereas he is necessarily not in touch with them in that way when movements of his body are occurring without his making them.

What is this way? Is it a way that spiders are also in touch with their actions?

Frankfurt’s mistake?

‘According to causal theories [...] the essential difference between events of the two types [actions vs things that merely happen to an agent] is to be found in their prior causal histories: a [pattern of joint displacements and bodily configurations] is an action if and only if it results from antecedents of a certain kind.’

\citep[p.~157]{frankfurt1978problem}.

Frankfurt, 1978 p. 157

I said Davidson is offering a causal theory in Frankfurt’s sense. But it appears that he is not.

Contrast Frankfurt, 1978 with Bach, 1978

‘though attempting to account for how action is initiated, they fail to deal with how it is executed. Nevertheless, I believe Causalism to be fundamentally correct’

\citep[p.~361]{bach:1978_representational}

Bach, 1978 p. 361

conclusion

In conclusion, ...

What is the mark that distinguishes actions?

Davidson’s View

It is intention (or justifying reasons).

Objections:

Frankfurt’s Argument from Spiders

Bach’s objections from ...

Objection from Knowledge

Deviant Causal Chains

Being in Touch

Frankfurt’s View

Action is ‘behaviour whose course is under the guidance of an agent’.

Two Problems:

What is guidance?

When is guidance ‘attributable to an agent’?