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\title {Central Themes in Philosophy \\ Lecture 14}
 
\maketitle
 

Lecture 14:

Central Themes

\def \ititle {Lecture 14}
\def \isubtitle {Central Themes}
\begin{center}
{\Large
\textbf{\ititle}: \isubtitle
}
 
\iemail %
\end{center}

Why?

Steve’s Oct 4th, 2018 1.11pm utterance
Earth is being warmed by human activity.
is true because Earth is being warmed by human activity.

Steve’s Oct 4th, 2018 1.11pm utterance
Mars is being warmed by human activity.
is false because Mars is not being warmed by human activity.

Here is a true utterance.
...and here is a false utterance.
What makes for this difference between the two utterances? Why is one true but the other false? This is an easy question to answer, I think ...
Now for a much harder question ...
Now for a much harder question: Why is ’s’ true because p? How does it come about that this is what makes the utterance true?

‘Earth’ refers to this planet.

‘Mars’ refers to a different planet.

Why?

Discovering that ‘Superman is Superman’ is true would not be informative to Lois.

Discovering that ‘Superman is Clarke Kent’ is true would be informative to Lois.

A Simpler Observation

If we adopt the view that meaning is reference, ...

1. ‘Superman’ refers to Superman.

2. ‘Clarke Kent’ refers to Clarke Kent.

but:

3. Superman is Clarke Kent

therefore (from 2 & 3):

4. ‘Clarke Kent’ refers to Superman.

therefore (from 1 & 4):

5. ‘Clarke Kent’ and ‘Superman’ refer to the same thing.

Why?

Discovering that ‘Superman is Superman’ is true would not be informative to Lois.

Discovering that ‘Superman is Clarke Kent’ is true would be informative to Lois.

Frege’s idea

Proper names have senses as well as references.

‘Superman’ and ‘Clarke Kent’ have different senses.

The difference in sense explains the difference in informativeness

 

Sense and Descriptions

 
\section{Sense and Descriptions}
 
\section{Sense and Descriptions}

Samantha is Samantha

Samantha is Charly

Samantha Caine

Suburban homemaker and the ideal mom to her 8 year old daughter Caitlin. She lives in a New England small town, teaches in a local school and makes the best Rice Krispie treats in town.

Charly Baltimore

a highly trained secret agent and cold-blooded killer involved in the government's most unscrupulous affairs.

It is perhaps tempting to think of senses as descriptions ... at least, this way you can see how sense fulfils the three functions given on the previous slide

?

The sense of my utterance of ‘Charly Baltimore’ is this description:
the highly trained secret agent suffering from amnesia in New England.

The sense of my utterance of ‘Samantha Caine’ is this description:
the New England teacher with an 8 year old daughter who makes the best Rice Krispie treats in town.

‘all that anyone has been able to think of is that different [i.e. senses] are a matter of different descriptions being associated with the signs.

Some other views have been tried ... But these ideas have not been found compelling’

Campbell, 2011 p. 340

I wish someone had told me this before. I have the sense that the answer was out there and I could not find it.
‘all that anyone has been able to think of is that different modes of presentation [i.e. senses] are a matter of different descriptions being associated with the signs. Some other views have been tried, such as those that say all uses of co-referential terms in a single discourse must be anaphorically linked. But these ideas have not been found compelling’ \citep[p.~340]{campbell:2011_visual}.
This isn’t an argument ... we can do better
Is this correct?

?

The sense of my utterance of ‘Charly Baltimore’ is this description:
the highly trained secret agent suffering from amnesia in New England.

The sense of my utterance of ‘Samantha Caine’ is this description:
the New England teacher with an 8 year old daughter who makes the best Rice Krispie treats in town.

Contrast that utterance of ‘Charly is Charly’ with the utterance ‘Charly is Samantha’

ftbe: These may differ in informativeness.

Terminology: call whatever aspect of meaning explains the difference ‘sense’.

If senses are descriptions, can they explain why one utterance is informative and the other not?
Jein: Ja--we can see that the descriptions are different; Nein--what does this have to do with informativeness?
To understand sense, we need to link it to knowledge of reference (as I explained last time) ...

The sense of an utterance of a word (or phrase)
is what you know when you
have knowledge of reference.

NB: sense isn’t knowledge of reference, but the think known.
How are these connected?

Contrast that utterance of ‘Charly is Charly’ with the utterance ‘Charly is Samantha’

ftbe: These may differ in informativeness.

Terminology: call whatever aspect of meaning explains the difference ‘sense’.

So if senses are descriptions and if sense are what you know when you have knowledge of reference, can we explain the difference in informativeness?
Yes, absolutely.

?

The sense of my utterance of ‘Charly Baltimore’ is this description:
the highly trained secret agent suffering from amnesia in New England.

The sense of my utterance of ‘Samantha Caine’ is this description:
the New England teacher with an 8 year old daughter who makes the best Rice Krispie treats in town.

\title {Central Themes in Philosophy \\ Lecture 14}
 
\maketitle
 

Lecture 14:

Central Themes

\def \ititle {Lecture 14}
\def \isubtitle {Central Themes}
\begin{center}
{\Large
\textbf{\ititle}: \isubtitle
}
 
\iemail %
\end{center}

action

Q

What is the mark that distinguishes actions?

\citep{Davidson:1971fz}.

‘The problem of action is to explicate the contrast between
what an agent does
and
what merely happens to him‘

\citep[p.~157]{frankfurt1978problem}.

Frankfurt, 1978 p. 157

Can’t be some feature of the behaviour itself, some kinematic marker?

actions

Intentionally tripping on a rug.

mere events

Accidentally tripping on a rug.

Also can’t be coordination of movements, since your movements can be highly coordinated even if you are not acting.

Cycling on an exercise bike.

Being cycled by an exercise bike.

Q

What is the mark that distinguishes actions?

\citep{Davidson:1971fz}.

‘The problem of action is to explicate the contrast between
what an agent does
and
what merely happens to him‘

\citep[p.~157]{frankfurt1978problem}.

Frankfurt, 1978 p. 157

It is intention.

‘According to causal theories [...] the essential difference between events of the two types [actions vs things that merely happen to an agent] is to be found in their prior causal histories: a [pattern of joint displacements and bodily configurations] is an action if and only if it results from .antecedents antecedents of a certain kind .’

\citep[p.~157]{frankfurt1978problem}.

Frankfurt, 1978 p. 157

Ie intentions
 
\section{Frankfurt’s Argument from Spiders}
 
\section{Frankfurt’s Argument from Spiders}
[Not sure whether to cast this as an objection to causal theories or as a generally interesting argument? Maybe Davidson vs Frankfurt opposition could start from the Frankfurt’s Argument from Spiders and then go on to guidance vs causal history?]

Frankfurt’s Argument from Spiders

(I will take you through it then ask you to reconstruct the argument.)

‘the contrast between actions and mere happenings can readily be discerned elsewhere than in the lives of people.

There are numerous agents besides ourselves, who may be active as well as passive with respect to the movements of their bodies.’

Including spiders.

‘The two contrasts [one in the case of humans, one in the case of spiders] are the same’

‘Each contrasts instances in which purposive behavior is attributable to a creature as agent and instances in which this is not the case.’

Explications of the distinction between actions and events that merely happen to an agent cannot rely on ‘distinctive higher faculties which characteristically come into play when a person acts’, nor ‘upon concepts which are inapplicable to spiders’.

\citep[p.~162]{frankfurt1978problem}.

Frankfurt, 1978 p. 162

reconstruct the argument

1. There is a contrast between actions and mere happenings in the lives of spiders.

2. The contrast in the lives of humans is the same.

3. Spiders do not have intentions, nor do they deliberate about what to do.

Therefore (from 1 & 3):

4. The contrast in the case of spiders cannot be explicated by appeal to intention.

Therefore (from 2 & 4):

5. The contrast in the case of humans cannot be explicated by appeal to intention.

Do you understand the argument? If so, is it sound + valid?

What is the mark that distinguishes actions?

Davidson’s View

It is intention.

Objection:

Frankfurt’s Argument from Spiders

Frankfurt’s View

Action is ‘behaviour whose course is under the guidance of an agent’.

Two Problems:

What is guidance?

When is guidance ‘attributable to an agent’?

Consider that the spider’s movements walking on the web are guided by the web’s structure. And similarly for your actions when driving on the roads. (Guiding is not only something you do, but something that is done to you.)