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Are the problems insoluble?

I’m no an economist, but ...

A bank rescue package totalling some £500 billion was announced by the British government on 8 October 2008, as a response to the ongoing global financial crisis.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2008_United_Kingdom_bank_rescue_package

UK GDP in 2008: roughly £1600 billion.

https://www.economist.com/international/2017/03/30/the-world-has-made-great-progress-in-eradicating-extreme-poverty

What the UK committed to spend on rescuing banks in 2008 would have been more than enough to lift every person in the world out of poverty for that entire year.
But, yes, banks are good too.
Unless they prefer banks to people,

Affluent individuals and countries should eradicate poverty because

... they are responsible for the harms it causes (Pogge).

vs

... they have a moral obligation to help (Patten).

I started with this quote from Nussbaum. What I’m suggesting is that there’s something distracting about it: the question about whether or not nationality is morally irrelevant isn’t transformative or even that important (although it’s not without interest).
The transformative thought is Amartya Sen’s: we should ‘bring everyone into the domain of concern, without eliminating anyone’.
This is much less controversial

‘To count people as moral equals is to treat nationality, ethnicity, religion, class, race and gender and ‘morally irrelevant’---as irrelevant to that equal standing.

 
\section{Bok and Sen on Sidgwick’s Dilemma}
 
\section{Bok and Sen on Sidgwick’s Dilemma}

Old Question (Bad)

Is nationality a ‘morally irrelevant characteristic’?

New Question (Better)

Is nationality morally irrelevant to how people of different nationalities should be treated or valued?

‘Henry Sidgwick took the contrast between [...] two perspectives to be so serious as to threaten any coherent view of ethics.

On one hand, he held as the fundamental principle of ethics “that another’s greater good is to be preferred to one’s own lesser good.” According to this principle, any sacrifice on one’s own part would be called for, so long as it could achieve a greater good for others, no matter where they lived.

On the other hand, Sidgwick also accepted what he called the common-sense view that our obligations to help others differ depending on the relationships in which we stand to them---relationships of family member, friend, neighbor, and fellow citizen.’

\citep[p.~40]{bok:1996_love}

Bok 1996, p. 40

Should we therefore reject the claim that nationality is ethically irrelevant after all?
For our purposes it doesn’t matter very much thanks to Sen.
The primary thing is to ‘bring everyone into the domain of concern, without eliminating anyone’. After doing that, we may find reason to give ‘additional weight to the interests of those who are linked to us in some significant way’ \citep[p.~114]{sen:1996_love}.

‘our common humanity has perspicuous moral relevance’

‘one’s fundamental allegiance is to humanity at large’

The primary thing is to ‘bring everyone into the domain of concern, without eliminating anyone’

After that, we may find reason to give ‘additional weight to the interests of those who are linked to us in some significant way’

Sen, 1996 p. 114

I’m not sure Sen’s reasoning for this
But the reasoning is less important than the conclusion.
recall the dilemma from Bok-Sidgwick ...
Can you see how Sen helps with the dilemma?
I think: there’s no real tension here at all. Obligations to help others do differ depending on citizenship; but the primary thing is obligations to people as people.
So the key here is that there is a ranking of things.

‘Henry Sidgwick took the contrast between [...] two perspectives to be so serious as to threaten any coherent view of ethics.

On one hand, he held as the fundamental principle of ethics “that another’s greater good is to be preferred to one’s own lesser good.” According to this principle, any sacrifice on one’s own part would be called for, so long as it could achieve a greater good for others, no matter where they lived.

On the other hand, Sidgwick also accepted what he called the common-sense view that our obligations to help others differ depending on the relationships in which we stand to them---relationships of family member, friend, neighbor, and fellow citizen.’

Bok 1996, p. 40

How is Sen’s point

about bringing everyone into the domain of concern

relevant to Pogge

on responsibility for poverty-caused harms?

My view: Pogge’s arguments are not supposed to depend on any strong claim about nationality and cosompolitanism; they are supposed to depend only on the weak claim that everyone is in the domain of concern (insofar as their basic human rights should not be violated).
I started with this quote from Nussbaum. What I’m suggesting is that there’s something distracting about it: the question about whether or not nationality is morally irrelevant isn’t transformative or even that important (although it’s not without interest).
The transformative thought is Amartya Sen’s: we should ‘bring everyone into the domain of concern, without eliminating anyone’.
This is much less controversial

‘To count people as moral equals is to treat nationality, ethnicity, religion, class, race and gender and ‘morally irrelevant’---as irrelevant to that equal standing.

The transformative thought is Amartya Sen’s: we should ‘bring everyone into the domain of concern, without eliminating anyone’.
This is less controversial, but hardly less demanding (it requires us to act differently ...)
In fact, if Pogge is right (previous lecture), then this is something which citizens of affluent countries are failing to do.

We should ‘bring everyone into the domain of concern, without eliminating anyone’

Sen, 1996 p. 114

conclusion

In conclusion, ...

1. Distinguish nations from states.

2. State membership is (arguably) morally relevant to how someone is treated or valued.

3. But what matters is whether we ‘bring everyone into the domain of concern, without eliminating anyone’ (Sen).

4. Pogge’s argument depends on no stronger assumptions about states.

And Nussbaum’s claim is doubly defective for our purposes. Doubly defective: first, it’s really states rather than nations that we should be focucsed on (so weak target; of course *nations* are morally irrelvant). Second, it’s not their moral relevance that matters but their moral primacy.

open day

\title {Central Themes in Philosophy \\ Lecture 10}
 
\maketitle
 

Lecture 10:

Central Themes

\def \ititle {Lecture 10}
\def \isubtitle {Central Themes}
\begin{center}
{\Large
\textbf{\ititle}: \isubtitle
}
 
\iemail %
\end{center}
 
\section{Sense and Reference: The Question}
 
\section{Sense and Reference: The Question}

This man is about to step out in front of a bus.

This man is Ben.

Therefore:

Ben is about to step out in front of a bus.

Andrea is in her office speaking on the telephone to her friend Ben. As she looks out of the window, Andrea notices a man on the street below using his mobile phone. He’s not looking where he’s going; he’s about to step out in front of a bus. Andrea does not realise that this man is Ben, the friend she is speaking to. She bangs the window and waves frantically in an attempt to warn the man, but says nothing into the phone.
\citep[adapted from][p.~439]{Richard:1983rl}

Andrea is in her office speaking on the telephone to her friend Ben. As she looks out of the window, Andrea notices a man on the street below using his mobile phone. He’s not looking where he’s going; he’s about to step out in front of a bus. Andrea does not realise that this man is Ben, the friend she is speaking to. She bangs the window and waves frantically in an attempt to warn the man, but says nothing into the phone.

adapted from Richard, 1983 p. 439

All I’m saying at this point is that we’re getting into a mess ...
recall this quote from personal identity ...

‘Identity is utterly simple and unproblematic.

Everything is identical to itself; nothing is ever identical to anything else except itself.

There is never any problem about what makes something identical to itself; nothing can ever fail to be.

And there is never any problem about what makes two things identical; two things never can be identical.’

Lewis, 1989 pp. 192--3

‘Identity gives rise to challenging questions which are not altogether easy to answer.’

\citep[p.~209]{frege:1948_sense}

Frege, 1948 p. 209

What doesn’t Andrea realise?

That this man is Ben.

Numerical identity.

‘This man is Ben’ expresses a fact about numerical identity.

conclusion

In conclusion, ...

Apparently inconsistent triad:

Andrea’s action hinges on her not knowing and understanding that ‘This man is Ben’ is true.

‘This man is Ben’ expresses a fact about numerical identity.

Identity is utterly simple and unproblematic.