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\title {Central Themes in Philosophy \\ Lecture 03}
 
 
 
\maketitle
 
--------
\subsection{title-slide}
 
 
\section{Perception without Awareness?}
 
--------
\subsection{slide-5}
‘Here lies the fatal flaw in [...] the philosophy of mind,
--------
\subsection{slide-6}
for, in using as evidence what seems reasonable or persuasive, philosophers ultimately rely on their own introspections.
--------
\subsection{slide-7}
They look inside themselves in an attempt to discover the design of the mind’
\citep[p.~380]{bridgeman2004philosophy}
 
--------
\subsection{slide-8}
We are not going to do that ...
 
--------
\subsection{slide-20}
Are we convinced by this evidence?
 
--------
\subsection{simple\_seeing}
 
 
\section{Simple Seeing}
 
--------
\subsection{slide-23}
‘If psychologists can really identify something that deserves to be called perception without awareness, they must have an operational grasp on not only what it takes to perceive something, but on what it takes to be conscious of it.
\citep[p.~148]{Dretske:2006fv}
 
--------
\subsection{slide-26}
We need to start by clarifying what we mean by perceiving. To this end I want to introduce an old story that we will also use later (for Sense \& Reference).
 
--------
\subsection{slide-36}
How did I get here?
 
--------
\subsection{slide-50}
Dretske introduces the notion of \emph{simple seeing} (see \citealp[chapter 6]{Dretske:2000ky}; the same thing is called as ‘nonepistemic seeing’ in \citep{Dretske:1969td}). The key characteristic of simple seeing: if X is the F, then \emph{S sees X} is equivalent to \emph{S sees the F}.
\citep[p.~54]{Dretske:1969td}.
 
‘Seeing objects is a way of getting information about them. What makes it seeing (rather than, say, hearing) is the intrinsic character of those events occurring in us that carry the information. What makes it X (rather than Y) that we see is that the information these internal events carry is information about X (rather than Y). Everything else [...] is [...] something the scientist, not the philosopher, should provide’ \citep[p.~112]{Dretske:2000ky}.
 
--------
\subsection{slide-52}
‘If psychologists can really identify something that deserves to be called perception without awareness, they must have an operational grasp on not only what it takes to perceive something, but on what it takes to be conscious of it.
\citep[p.~148]{Dretske:2006fv}
 
We have been clarifying what we mean by perceiving.
 
--------
\subsection{slide-54}
The question is trivial if we interpret ‘perceive’ so that this (Lois’ seeing superman but not being aware of the unbearable coward) counts as a case of perceiving without awareness.
 
To make this question hard, and therefore interesting, we need to understand ‘perceive’ in the sense of simple seeing.
 
--------
\subsection{slide-56}
‘Perception without awareness [...] is therefore to be understood as perception of some object without awareness [...] of that object’
\citep{Dretske:2006fv}.
 
--------
\subsection{slide-57}
Note that we have not attempted to discover the design of the mind, merely made a distinction.
 
‘Here lies the fatal flaw in [...] the philosophy of mind,
for, in using as evidence what seems reasonable or persuasive, philosophers ultimately rely on their own introspections.
They look inside themselves
in an attempt
to discover the design of the mind
\citep[p.~380]{bridgeman2004philosophy}
 
--------
\subsection{perception\_criteria}
 
 
\section{A Test for Perception?}
 
--------
\subsection{slide-60}
‘If psychologists can really identify something that deserves to be called perception without awareness, they must have an operational grasp on not only what it takes to perceive something, but on what it takes to be conscious of it.
\citep[p.~148]{Dretske:2006fv}
 
We have been clarifying what we mean by perceiving in terms of simple seeing.
 
But can we go further and give a ‘test for perception’?
 
--------
\subsection{slide-62}
This was the point of talking about simple seeing.
 
--------
\subsection{slide-64}
But: allergic reactions to ragweed
 
--------
\subsection{operationalisation}
 
 
\section{Operationalising Perception and Perceptual Awareness}
 
--------
\subsection{slide-71}
‘If psychologists can really identify something that deserves to be called perception without awareness, they must have an operational grasp on not only what it takes to perceive something, but on what it takes to be conscious of it.
\citep[p.~148]{Dretske:2006fv}
 
--------
\subsection{slide-75}
This was the point of talking about simple seeing.
 
--------
\subsection{awareness\_criteria\_part1}
 
 
\section{Operationalising Visual Awareness}
 
--------
\subsection{slide-81}
‘If psychologists can really identify something that deserves to be called perception without awareness, they must have an operational grasp on not only what it takes to perceive something, but on what it takes to be conscious of it.
\citep[p.~148]{Dretske:2006fv}
 
--------
\subsection{slide-85}
This was the point of talking about simple seeing.
 
--------
\subsection{slide-90}
Task 1 vs Task 2 : example of biased vs unbiased response
 
--------
\subsection{slide-97}
shifting criteria. A point made by \citet{cowey:2010_blindsighta} and Phillips
 
--------
\subsection{slide-98}
‘If psychologists can really identify something that deserves to be called perception without awareness, they must have an operational grasp on not only what it takes to perceive something, but on what it takes to be conscious of it.
\citep[p.~148]{Dretske:2006fv}
 
--------
\subsection{slide-99}
In conclusion, ...
 
\def \ititle {Lecture 03}
 
\def \isubtitle {Central Themes}
 
\begin{center}
 
{\Large
 
\textbf{\ititle}: \isubtitle
 
}
 
 
 
\iemail %
 
\end{center}
 
 
 
\section{Perception without Awareness?}
 
‘Here lies the fatal flaw in [...] the philosophy of mind,
for, in using as evidence what seems reasonable or persuasive, philosophers ultimately rely on their own introspections.
They look inside themselves in an attempt to discover the design of the mind’
\citep[p.~380]{bridgeman2004philosophy}
 
 
 
\section{Simple Seeing}
 
‘If psychologists can really identify something that deserves to be called perception without awareness, they must have an operational grasp on not only what it takes to perceive something, but on what it takes to be conscious of it.
\citep[p.~148]{Dretske:2006fv}
 
Dretske introduces the notion of \emph{simple seeing} (see \citealp[chapter 6]{Dretske:2000ky}; the same thing is called as ‘nonepistemic seeing’ in \citep{Dretske:1969td}). The key characteristic of simple seeing: if X is the F, then \emph{S sees X} is equivalent to \emph{S sees the F}.
\citep[p.~54]{Dretske:1969td}.
 
‘Seeing objects is a way of getting information about them. What makes it seeing (rather than, say, hearing) is the intrinsic character of those events occurring in us that carry the information. What makes it X (rather than Y) that we see is that the information these internal events carry is information about X (rather than Y). Everything else [...] is [...] something the scientist, not the philosopher, should provide’ \citep[p.~112]{Dretske:2000ky}.
 
‘If psychologists can really identify something that deserves to be called perception without awareness, they must have an operational grasp on not only what it takes to perceive something, but on what it takes to be conscious of it.
\citep[p.~148]{Dretske:2006fv}
 
‘Perception without awareness [...] is therefore to be understood as perception of some object without awareness [...] of that object’
\citep{Dretske:2006fv}.
 
 
 
\section{A Test for Perception?}
 
‘If psychologists can really identify something that deserves to be called perception without awareness, they must have an operational grasp on not only what it takes to perceive something, but on what it takes to be conscious of it.
\citep[p.~148]{Dretske:2006fv}
 
What does it take to perceive something? By what test could we measure whether someone has perceived a particular object? According to Dretske, to perceive an object: \begin{itemize} \item you must have got information about the thing; and \item ‘the information in these states should be available for the control and guidance of action’; and \item ‘the information should be extracted from stimulation [...] by accredited receptor systems’ \citep[p.~150]{Dretske:2006fv}. \end{itemize}
 
Note Dretske’s qualification: ‘Even with the additional qualifications [not specified here], this ‘test’ for perception of an object is not going to withstand philosophical scrutiny---too many loose ends and philosophically troublesome qualifiers’ \citep[p.~151]{Dretske:2006fv}.
 
 
 
\section{Operationalising Perception and Perceptual Awareness}
 
‘If psychologists can really identify something that deserves to be called perception without awareness, they must have an operational grasp on not only what it takes to perceive something, but on what it takes to be conscious of it.
\citep[p.~148]{Dretske:2006fv}
 
 
 
\section{Operationalising Visual Awareness}
 
‘If psychologists can really identify something that deserves to be called perception without awareness, they must have an operational grasp on not only what it takes to perceive something, but on what it takes to be conscious of it.
\citep[p.~148]{Dretske:2006fv}
 
‘If psychologists can really identify something that deserves to be called perception without awareness, they must have an operational grasp on not only what it takes to perceive something, but on what it takes to be conscious of it.
\citep[p.~148]{Dretske:2006fv}
 

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\title {Central Themes in Philosophy \\ Lecture 03}
 
\maketitle
 
\section{Perception without Awareness?}
 
\section{Perception without Awareness?}
 
\section{Simple Seeing}
 
\section{Simple Seeing}
 
\section{A Test for Perception?}
 
\section{A Test for Perception?}
 
\section{Operationalising Perception and Perceptual Awareness}
 
\section{Operationalising Perception and Perceptual Awareness}
 
\section{Operationalising Visual Awareness}
 
\section{Operationalising Visual Awareness}